COMMENTS
Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction
Unincorporated associations,' unlike corporations, are not regarded as citizens for purposes of determining federal jurisdicton
based on diversity of citizenship. Although many unincorporated
associations can sue and be sued in the association name, 2 the law
of diversity jurisdiction treats them as aggregates of individuals: in
an action by or against an unincorporated association the relevant
citizenship for diversity purposes is the citizenship of each of the
"persons composing" the association.' The practical effect of this
treatment, given the extended rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss that
diversity jurisdiction does not attach unless the citizenship of each
party is diverse from that of each opposing party, is to close the
federal diversity jurisdiction to many large unincorporated associations.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,5 the Second Circuit
mitigated the effects upon modern limited partnerships of the unincorporated association rule by holding that the persons composing
a limited partnership for purposes of diversity jurisdiction are the
general partners only. The Third Circuit in the recent case of
CarlsbergResources Corp. v. CambriaSavings & Loan Association
has rejected Colonial Realty's application of the unincorporated
association rule, and has held that in a suit involving a limited
partnership the relevant citizenship is not only that of the general
partners, but that of the limited partners as well.
This comment examines the principles underlying the diversity
rules for both incorporated and unincorporated associations, and
evaluates the ColonialRealty and CarlsbergResources decisions in
light of those principles. The comment embraces the general rule set
I Collected under the term "unincorporated associations" are such diverse non-corporate
entities as joint stock companies, business trusts, partnerships, limited partnerships, labor
unions, and fraternal organizations.
2 See, e.g., the following "common name" statutes conferring on partnerships the capacity to sue and be sued in partnership name: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-112 (West 1960);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2051(2) (1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1025 (McKinney 1976).
3 E.g., Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
8 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'g 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
384
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forth by the dissenting opinion in Carlsberg Resources, and concludes by suggesting how that rule should be applied in cases involving limited partnerships and modern business trusts.
I.

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND THE COMPLETE DIVERSITY
REQUIREMENT

Original jurisdiction over questions involving parties of
"diverse" citizenship was first vested in the federal courts by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Since that time, despite recurring criticism
of the policy underlying diversity jurisdiction,' actions between citizens of different states have been maintainable in federal courts?
Congress, however, has never granted the courts the broadest possible diversity jurisdiction permitted by the Constitution. Amendments to the Judiciary Act have traced a pattern first of expansion,'"
then contraction" of the scope of the jurisdiction.
Supreme Court decisions have had a profound impact on the
bounds of the diversity jurisdiction. The most significant judicial
gloss on the diversity statute was the Strawbridge "complete diversity" requirement, which "forbids suits in the federal courts unless
7 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, (1789-1799), provided for jurisdiction
of the federal courts when "the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought,
and a citizen of another State." Specific authority for diversity jurisdiction derives from
article Il of the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to. .. Controversies. . .between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. 3,
§ 2.
, Recently, Chief Justice Burger has announced that the Judicial Conference of the
United States will recommend that Congress abolish diversity jurisdiction. U.S. Supreme
Court, Public Information Office, Release of March 11, 1977, noted in Carlsberg Resources
Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1263 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977). See Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); cf.
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (part I),36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 68 (1968) (notes difficulty of defining limits of jurisdiction). But see Moore & Weckstein,
Corporationsand Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited,
77 HARv. L. Rav. 1426, 1449-51 (1964).
1 The current diversity statute is at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Section 1332(a) provides in
pertinent part that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States."
," The grant of diversity jurisdiction was broadened significantly by the Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. (pt. 3) 470 (1875), which eliminated the requirement that one party
be a citizen of the forum state, requiring instead only a controversy "between citizens of
different States." Id.
" The jurisdictional amount in controversy has been increased from $500 under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789-99) to $10,000 under the current statute,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(a) (1970). The 1958 amendments to the jurisdictional statute also
narrowed the scope of diversity actions by proiding that a corporation is deemed a citizen
of the state of its principal place of business as well as of its state of incorporation. Pub. L.
No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970)).
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all the parties on one side are of citizenship diverse to those on the
other side. '1 2 The complete diversity requirement, in turn, opened
up a difficult new field of jurisdictional jurisprudence devoted to the
question of whose citizenship matters in multiparty lawsuits. 3 A
most troublesome conceptual problem arose in cases involving associations, both incorporated and unincorporated: does the association have citizenship for purposes of the diversity statute 4 or must
the court look to the citizenship of its individual members? The
Court resolved the issue of corporate citizenship over 120 years ago
in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,5 by announcing a rule
which effectively treated corporations as citizens of the state of
incorporation. The Court has consistently refused, however, to extend the Marshall approach to unincorporated associations.
Corporate Citizenship and Diversity Jurisdiction

A.

The Supreme Court first considered the problem of corporate
citizenship in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 11an action by
a Pennsylvania corporation against individuals who were citizens of
Georgia. The Court concluded that, although a corporation as a
distinct legal entity was not a citizen within the meaning of the
Constitution or the Judiciary Act, it could invoke diversity jurisdiction on the basis of the citizenship of its individual corporate shareholders.' 7 Looking through the corporate entity to its constituent
members, the Court found that an action to which a corporation is
a party is "in fact and in law" an action by or against "those persons
suing in their corporate character, by their corporate name for a
corporate right.""
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939).
The question of whose citizenship counts would have far less importance were it not
for Strawbridge.Before Strawbridge,jurisdiction could be invoked upon the finding that one
party was diverse from a single opposing party. Obviously, very hard questions about relevant
citizenship would seldom be reached under such a rule. The Strawbridge rule requires reaching those questions in every case.
11Neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act defined the word "citizen" until the
1958 amendment to the Judiciary Act provided a rule for fixing corporate citizenship.
IS 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). See text and notes at notes 22-29 & 136-137 infra.
" 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.).
17 Id. at 86-87, 91-92.
11Id. at 87. Chief Justice Marshall seems to have stretched reality in reaching this result.
A suit by or against a corporation is neither procedurally nor substantively a suit by or against
the shareholders. Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens and Possessorsof Liberty, 94 U.
PA. L. REv. 202, 213 (1946). In effect, the Court treated the shareholders as partners for
purposes of establishing jurisdiction, McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction (pt. 1), 56 HARv.
L. REv. 853, 868 (1943), even though shareholders, unlike partners, may not be joined and
sued to enforce an entity liability. Conversely, shareholders may not join or sue as a class to
enforce a corporate claim, except in a shareholders' derivative suit, where the action belongs
to the corporation and any judgment redounds to its benefit.
12
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With the growth of interstate commerce and the increasing
dispersion of the ownership of corporate stock, the requirement of
complete diversity of all shareholders came to effectively preclude
many corporations from invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Noting the widespread criticism of the Strawbridge
and Deveaux decisions, the Supreme Court in Louisville, Cincinnati
& Charleston Railroad v. Letson"9 reexamined the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders, and the significance of
that relationship for purposes of the diversity statute. The Court
stated that the shareholders had enough of an interest in the action
that their citizenship could, through the medium of the corporation,
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of an action "between citizens," but added that the citizenship of one or more of them could
not be pleaded to defeat jurisdiction since they were not parties to
the action.20 The Court held that a corporation, as an artificial entity, should be deemed 21
a citizen of the state of its incorporation for
jurisdictional purposes.

In Marshallv. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,2 the Supreme Court
again faced the corporate citizenship problem. Although it rejected
the proposition stated in Letson that a corporation was a citizen of
its state of incorporation, the Court nevertheless concluded that
diversity jurisdiction could not be defeated by the citizenship of the
shareholders. The Court noted at the outset that although a corporation is not itself a citizen, one who deals with a corporation does
not deal with a "mere metaphysical abstraction" but with directors
and officers, the representatives of the shareholders, whose citizenship satisfies the constitutional requirement of a controversy
"between Citizens."' The Court then spoke to the propriety of de43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
Id. at 554.
2,Id. at 555. The holding of the case does not seem to follow from the reasoning that
"

precedes it. It is unclear how the Court got from its analysis of the interest and role of the
shareholders to the conclusion that a corporation is to be deemed a citizen. The source of the
confusion in this case is that the Court faced three distinct issues: (1) whether a suit involving a corporation as a party met the constitutional requirement of a suit "between Citizens";
(2) whether the provision of § 11 of the Judiciary Act requiring "a citizen of the State where
the suit is brought" meant that every shareholder (or any shareholder) must be a citizen of
that state; and (3) whether the statutory requirement (as construed by Strawbridge) of a
controversy between citizens of different states required diversity of all the shareholders.
Although the Court's reasoning only supported the holding with respect to the first of these
issues, the Court regarded all three issues as resolved. Thus, concerning the issue of complete
diversity, the Court said: "Our conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider that averment in the plea which denies jurisdiction on the ground that citizens of the same state with
the plaintiff are members of corporations . . .which are members of [defendant]." Id. at
559.
, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
13

Id. at 327.
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termining jurisdiction on the basis of the citizenship of the shareholders, who exercise no control over the litigation:
[R]epresentatives of numerous unknown and everchanging
associates should [not] be permitted to allege the different
citizenship of one or more of these stockholders to defeat
[jurisdiction]. It is true that these stockholders are corporators, and represented by this "juridical person" and come
under the shadow of its name. But for all the purposes of acting, contracting, and judicial remedy, they can speak, act, and
plead, only through their representatives or curators. 4
Since, under then-controlling precedent, a corporation had no juridical existence outside the state of its creation, 25 the Court concluded
that those "persons who act under these [corporate] faculties and
use this corporate name, may be justly presumed to be resident" in
2
that state. 1
Although the reasoning of Marshall differed from that of
Letson, the result reached was identical to that achieved by deeming a corporation to be a citizen. Supreme Court decisions after
Letson variously interpreted that decision,2 but by 1895 the Court
had settled on the view that a corporation, although not a citizen,
could effectively invoke jurisdiction on the basis of the Marshall
presumption.2 When Congress amended the diversity statute in
1958 to define corporate citizenship, however, the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated that "[i]t is now established doctrine that a
corporation, for the purposes of jurisdiction, is deemed a citizen of
the State in which it is incorporated. "29 The jurisdictional statute
for corporations now states that "a corporation shall be deemed a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business." ' 0
Id. at 328.
Id. (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839)).
2 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 328. See generally Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392,
394 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964).
7 Compare Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 95 (1852)
(Catron, J., concurring); id. at 100-01 (Daniel, J., dissenting), with Covington Drawbridge
Co. v. Shepherd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227, 233 (1857) (Taney, J). For arguments that the
reasoning of the Marshall and Letson decisions is essentially identical, see Green, supra note
18, at 219-22; McGovney, supra note 18, at 894.
2 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562 (1896).
2 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3099, 3101.
31 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
24
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Unincorporated Associations

Diversity jurisdiction doctrine concerning unincorporated entities developed along different lines. In Chapman v. Barney3' the
Supreme Court held that an unincorporated New York joint stock
company32 could not be deemed a citizen of that state because it was
not a corporation and, therefore, that federal jurisdiction could be
invoked only if all the members of the company were of citizenship
diverse from that of the opposing parties.3 3 The Court found no
significance in the company's capacity to bring suit as an entity
under New York law: "Although it may be authorized by the laws
of the State of New York to bring suit in the name of its president,
that fact alone cannot give the company power . . . to sue in a
federal court. ' 34 Chapman's formulaic reliance on the corporate/non-corporate dichotomy decided the issue in Great Southern
Fire ProofHotel Co. v. Jones, 35 in which the defendant was a Pennsylvania limited partnership association. 6 The Court found that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts had not been established since
neither a "voluntary association" nor a non-corporate "body politic,
31129 U.S. 677 (1889).
32 A joint stock company or association is a capital-pooling entity with centralized management and transferable shares like a corporation, yet whose members maintain the property rights and liabilities of partners in a general partnership. Unlike a corporation, a joint
stock company is an entity formed pursuant to agreement of the parties rather than by grant
of authority of its state of organization. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 17879 [hereinafter cited as CRANE & BROMBERG]. The joint stock company is clearly distinguishable from the limited partnership and limited partnership association (see note 36 infra) in
that both of the latter entities derive exclusively from statutes that provide limitations on
the liability of some or all of the members. See generally R. ROWLEY & D. SivE, 2 ROWLEY ON
PARTNERSHIP 610-12 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as ROWLEY & Sxwv].
1 129 U.S. at 682.
31Id. In this respect, the Court echoed the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85-86 (1809).
3s 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
3' In a limited partnership association, the statute limits the liability of each partner to
the amount of his capital subscription to the partnership. See, e.g., 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
341-461 (1964) (repealed in part, 1965 Pa. Laws, Act No. 519, § 50(g)). Unlike the limited
partnership, however, the association has only one class of partner. Partners of this class have
the same ownership rights in partnership property as partners in a general partnership. In
its management structure and the transferability of its shares, the limited partnership association is similar to the joint stock company. See note 32 supra. See generally C. BATES, LAW
OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 232-49 (1886); CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 151-53. Only
five states-Pennsylvania, Virginia, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio-have enacted statutes
authorizing limited partnership associations. Virginia repealed its statute in 1918 and Pennsylvania repealed most of its statute in 1966. See statutes cited in id. at 151 nn.66 & 68.
The Pennsylvania statute in force at the time of Great Southern provided that limited
partnership associations "shall sue and be sued in their association name." C. BATES, supra,
at 246, (quoting Act of May 1, 1876, No. 51, § 3, 1876 Pa. Laws 89). See Great Southern Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. at 455. Individual partners could not be named as parties
to a suit against the association. C. BATES, supra, at 247.
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created by law," was a "citizen. ' '37 Although it noted that the association was in many ways analogous to a corporation, the Court8
refused to extend it citizenship on the strength of that analogy.1
Diversity jurisdiction, the Court ruled, depends on "the citizenship
of the several persons composing such association." 39
The Supreme Court has consistently and mechanically applied
the Chapman-GreatSouthern rule to various forms of unincorporated associations." Those few decisions that have departed from the
strict application of the rule have done so on the grounds that the
type of association in question was qualitatively so similar to a
corporation as to justify entity citizenship treatment.
In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.41 the Court faced the question
whether a sociedad en comandita, a business entity created under
Puerto Rican law, is a citizen for purposes of diversity. The Court
stated that although Anglo-American common law treats all unincorporated groups as partnerships, the civil law tradition of Puerto
Rico was to the contrary. Noting that the rule of corporate citizenship "found its theoretical justification only in the complete legal
personality with which corporations are endowed," 4 the Court
found that under Puerto Rican law the sociedad had the requisite
"complete legal personality."4 3 In so holding, the Court focused on
the fact that it was created pursuant to publicly filed articles of
organization, that it had capacity to contract, own property, and
litigate as an entity, that the management control might be vested
solely in the firm managers, and that creditors of the firm had
priority in attaching firm property over creditors of the individual
members. 4
In Mason v. American Express Co.,4" the Second Circuit interpreted Russell as a departure from the rigidity of Chapman. The
court held that a New York joint stock company (the same type of
31177 U.S. at 454 (quoting Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 405

(1855)).
177 U.S. at 456-57.
Id. at 456.
*
See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904); Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
,' 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
,2Id. at 479.
Id. at 480-81. Significantly, by granting the sociedad en comandita entity citizenship,
the Russell decision contracted the scope of federal jurisdiction over such entities. The Organic Act, which conferred jurisdiction on the District Court for Puerto Rico, required that
one party be a non-domiciliary of Puerto Rico. 288 U.S. at 478-79, 485.
" Id. at 481. With the exception of the filing of articles of incorporation, those elements
of the corporate "personality" of the sociedad are present as well in the limited partnership.
See notes 68, 70 infra. See generally RowLEY & Sirs, supra note 32, at 563-70.
334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
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business entity as that involved in Chapman) should be deemed a
citizen of its state of creation for diversity purposes. In an elaborate
analysis, Judge Waterman traced the development of the divergent
diversity rules with respect to corporations and non-corporate entities. He asserted that the Chapman Court had ignored the rationale
of Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad" and had failed to consider whether other legal characteristics of a joint stock company 7
would justify treating it as an entity for diversity purposes." The
court characterized the treatment of corporate-like entities under
the Chapman rule as not only illogical but patently unjust as well. 9
In seeming conflict with Mason was the decision of the Fourth50
Circuit in R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America,
an action by a North Carolina corporation against an unincorporated labor union. The court of appeals reversed the district court's
conclusion that a union was a "juridical person" equivalent to a
corporation, and, citing Chapman as support, held that the union's
citizenship for diversity purposes was that of its constituent members.

5,

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Bouligny case to
decide "whether an unincorporated labor union is to be treated as
a citizen for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction without regard
to the citizenship of its members. ' 52 The Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit on the basis of Chapman. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Fortas rejected the argument that the decision in Puerto
Rico v. Russell had "breached the doctrinal wall" of Chapman."
The issue in the Russell case, the Court explained, had been "fitting
an exotic creation of the civil law.

. .

into a federal scheme which

knew it not."" Although acknowledging the force of the criticisms
of Chapman in Mason and in the commentary, and not explicitly
disapproving Mason, the Court concluded that "these arguments,
however appealing, are addressed to an inappropriate forum, [as]
pleas for extension of the diversity jurisdiction to hitherto uncovered
broad categories of litigants ought to be made to the Congress and
1'Id. at 395. See text and notes

at notes 22-26 supra.
11See note 32 supra.
1 334 F.2d at 399-400.
" Id. at 402. The commentators have also attacked the inconsistency of the Chapman
decision. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 8, at 35; Comment, Diversity Jurisdictionfor Unincorporated Associations, 75 YAmm L.J. 138, 143 (1965).
336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964), afl'd, 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
, Id. at 161-63.
u United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 147 (1965).
0 Id. at 151.
54Id.
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not to the courts." 55 Justice Fortas failed to explain why the Court,
which historically had figured so prominently in the interpretation
and application of the diversity jurisdiction provisions, should feel
constrained to defer to the Congress on the issue of union citizenship.55 In the most convincing part of its opinion the Court emphasized a compelling practical consideration which militates against
treating a union as an entity for diversity purposes. While it is a
fairly easy task to fashion a rule for corporate citizenship, because
all corporations have a state of incorporation and must have a principal place of business,5 7 there is no obvious candidate for a rule
applicable to labor unions having both local and national levels of
organization. 8
The scope of the holding in Bouligny is unclear, as the narrow
holding of the case on the issue of the union's citizenship is overshadowed by the Court's very broad deference to Congress. One commentator, writing three years after Bouligny, noted that the implications of the decision appeared to overreach the sound reasoning
upon which the case was decided." Still, a close reading of Bouligny
suggests that the Court's language concerning the limitations of the
judicial role can be restricted to the facts of the case. The Court's
discussion of the difficulties of fashioning a test for labor union
citizenship can be read as explaining why only Congress could extend citizenship to unions as entities."
Because Bouligny can plausibly be read narrowly, the lower
courts might have continued to follow the Mason approach to determining jurisdiction in cases involving unincorporated associations.
Bouligny does not necessarily prohibit treating as "citizens" for
diversity purposes those entities that have significant corporate attributes."1 Nevertheless, the cases following Bouligny have read the
Court's opinion very broadly, and, with varying degrees of enthusiId. at 150-51.
5' Professor Currie has noted the incongruity of this deference in light of the "preeminently judicial function" of applying existing statutes to unanticipated situations. Currie,
supra note 8, at 35.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
382 U.S. at 152-53.
5' See Currie, supra note 8, at 35.
60 The Court specifically noted that extension of citizenship to corporations had not been
substantially hindered by the problem of formulating a citizenship test. 382 U.S. at 152.
'I Indeed, the application of the Bouligny decision to all forms of unincorporated association is difficult to justify. Although Bouligny and subsequent decisions have relied on the
significance of Congress' enactment of § 1332(c), the courts arguably have the power to
construe the meaning of "corporation" in that statute to include entities with significant
corporate attributes. Currie, supra note 20, at 35-36; 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 793, 794 n.20
(1966).
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asm 62 have held that unincorporated associations may not be
granted entity status for purposes of determining diversity. 3 Although some courts have based their holdings on the "tone and
philosophy" of Bouligny,14 others have extended the "proper forum"
rationale of Bouligny, and concluded that for unincorporated associations to be deemed citizens of a single state Congress would have
to enact a statute analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), which determines the citizenship of corporations in diversity cases." Although
the lower courts' applications of Bouligny may go beyond the scope
of that case in deferring to Congressional power to set the limits of
diversity jurisdiction, it appears that the courts will continue to
apply to all forms of unincorporated associations the rule that diversity depends on the citizenship of all members of the association.
As a result, some types of multi-state unincorporated entities are
effectively foreclosed from the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts.66
" Some of the opinions have made little effort to conceal their dissatisfaction with the
Bouligny decision. For example, in Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), Judge Luongo stated: "The reasoning of the Mason opinion is impressive ...
Nevertheless, language in the Supreme Court's decision in [Bouligny] convinces me that I
am not free to embrace the Mason approach." Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
61E.g., Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1974); Carey v. U.S.
Indus., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D.
La. 1973); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Mo. 1971); George
H. Draper, II, Inc. v. Canners Exch. Subscribers at Warner Inter-Ins. Bureau, 294 F. Supp.
1362 (D. Del. 1968).
" Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Pendley, 405 F. Supp. 593, 595 (N.D.
Ga. 1975).
" See, e.g., Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81, 93 (ED. Pa. 1974).
" In some circumstances, there may be alternative ways of bringing unincorporated
associations into federal courts. An unincorporated association may sue or be sued in one of
three ways: (1) as an entity under an applicable state common name statute; (2) as an
aggregate of individuals, either by joinder of all members, where they are jointly liable, or
individually, where the members are severally liable; and (3) as a class, by designating one
or more members of the association as representative of the class composed of all the members. 9A C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE 451-53 (1972). Even after
rejection of an "entity" approach to diversity jurisdiction over unincorporated associations
the latter two alternatives may result in diversity depending on the citizenship of the individuals selected. Suing only some members who are severally liable, however, may result in
incomplete recovery.
Courts and commentators have recognized the class action as a means of circumventing
the harsh result of Chapman and Boulignd since where a representative sues or is sued on
behalf of a class composed of an unincorporated association's members, only the citizenship
of the representative is relevant to diversity. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356 (1921). See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 402 (2d Cir. 1964); 51
CORNELL L.Q. 827, 831-32 (1966). Btt several commentators have found offensive the scope
of discretion plaintiffs have in choosing a federal forum through careful selection of a representative party, even when most members of the association may be non-diverse. See Comment, Citizenship of UnincorporatedAssociationsfor DiversityPurposes, 50 VA. L. REv. 1135,
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DETERMINING DIvERSITY FOR LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: Two RULES

Limited partnerships are creatures of statutory law, 7 now
treated with a high degree of uniformity under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, which has been adopted, with only minor deviations, throughout the United States." Although the limited partner1142 (1964); Comment, DiversityJurisdictionfor UnincorporatedAssociations, 75 YALE L.J.
138, 143-44 (1965).
The class action alternative became more complex with the enactment in 1966 of Federal
Rule 23.2. It provides especially for class actions by or against unincorporated associations
but leaves two issues unresolved. The first issue is whether an action may be maintained
under rule 23.2 without satisfying the prerequisites of rule 23(a). The commentary suggests
that it may be. E.g., 3B MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTIE 23.2.02, at 23.2-7 (1977). This conclusion
rests largely on the fact that rule 23.2 expressly incorporates the provisions of rules 23(d) and
23(e) in the text while omitting the provisions of rule 23(a). Id. Several recent district court
decisions, however, have taken the opposite view. E.g., Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar
Co., 52 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D.P.R. 1971). See 9A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at 457-58. The
inapplicability of rule 23(a) would produce some rather anomalous results. For example,
without the numerosity requirement, a diversity action could conceivably be maintained
against a two-man partnership by naming the diverse party as class representative.
The second question is whether a rule 23.2 action can be brought when applicable state
law either (1) prohibits class actions by or against unincorporated associations (by providing
for exclusive forms of remedy), or (2) provides permissive alternative methods for such associations to sue or be sued (for example, the common name statutes of most states). The first
issue arose prior to the 1966 amendment as well. The Third Circuit, in Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958), held that the Pennsylvania
common name statute was exclusive and suit could not be brought against an individual as
representative of a class of association members. Where a state's compton name statute was
not exclusive, though, the First Circuit held that a class action was maintainable. Oskoian
v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959). In Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52
F.R.D. 348, 355 (D.P.R. 1971), however, the district court read rule 23.2 as applicable only
when state law provides no mechanism for an unincorporated association to sue or be sued
as an entity. Accord, Lee v. Navarro Sav. Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1976). But
see Pyle v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 16 FED. RuLEs SERv. 2D 634 (D. Ore. 1974). The Advisory
Committee Note on rule 23.2 states that the main purpose of the rule is "to give 'entity treatment' to [an] association when for formal reasons it cannot sue or be sued as a jural person,"
which may suggest that the Suchem interpretation is correct. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2, Advisory
Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 108 (1967). But at least one commentator reads this language as supporting the view that rule 23.2 is supplementary to, and not in conflict with,
existing state provisions, and that even if a conflict exists the Federal Rules should govern.
9A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra,at 459. If permissive common name statutes are ultimately
held to preclude actions under rule 23.2, then the class action in most cases will offer no relief
from the Chapman-Bouligny rule.
" The first state limited partnership act was adopted in New York in 1822. An Act
Relative to Partnership, ch. 244, § 1, 1822 N.Y. LAWS 259. The New York act was patterned
after the "societe en commandite" under the French Commercial Code. C. BATES, LAW OF
LimrrED PARTNERsm' 20-21 (1886); see Comment, The Limited Partnership,45 YALE L.J. 895,
895-96 (1936).
" UNIFORM LimITED PARTNERsHip ACT §§ 1-31 (1916) [hereinafter cited without cross
reference as U.L.P.A.]. See generally REvISED UNIFORM Lim=.a PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 101-1105
(1976). The U.L.P.A. was drafted in 1916 to remedy failures of various state acts to protect
the "limited partners" from potentially unlimited liability. U.L.P.A. § 1, Official Comment.
Only Louisiana, with its unique partnership in commendam, has not adopted the U.L.P.A.
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ship was initially an investment device utilized by small groups of
investors for intrastate transactions,69 it has today become a popular
method of obtaining capital for all forms of business venture.7 0
Under the Chapman-Bouligny line of cases limited partnerships cannot be accorded entity citizenship for diversity purposes,71
even though they have many significant corporate-like attributes.
A literal application of the rule first announced in Great Southern
Fire Proof Hotel v. Jones,7 2 that in diversity cases involving a
"partnership association" the court will look to the citizenship of
"the several persons composing such association, '73 would demand
that the courts look to the citizenship of both the general and limited partners in testing for diversity of citizenship. In two recent
cases the Second and Third Circuits reached different conclusions
about the significance for diversity purposes of the two-level structure of the limited partnership, 74 and consequently disagreed over
whether the citizenship of limited partners counts for jurisdictional
purposes.
A.

Colonial Realty and CarlsbergResources
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 75 was the first diversity

Although some states, in enacting their limited partnership statutes, have made some
changes from the language of the U.L.P.A., most are insignificant for purposes of the discussion herein. Those changes that are relevant will be noted where appropriate. See generally
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, 6 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED (1969) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED].
The dates of enactment and corresponding statutory citations for those jurisdictions that have
adopted the U.L.P.A. are listed at 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 83 (Supp. 1977).
" Comment, Foreign Limited Partnerships:A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform
Limited PartnershipAct, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1174, 1176-77 (1974).
10 A typical limited partnership today will involve hundreds of investors, generally from
several states, as limited partners and will engage in multistate business transactions. These
large partnerships can be characterized as "public limited partnerships" because they are
offered as investments to the public, often through S.E.C.-registered prospectuses. See Hrusoff & Cazares, Formationof the PublicLimited Partnership,22 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1970).
71 For example, a limited partnership can exist only where authorized by state statute
or recognized by comity, The limited liability of the limited partners, U.L.P.A. §§ 1, 7, is
like that of corporate shareholders and the business of the partnership is conducted by the
general partners, U.L.P.A. § 9, in much the same way as corporate business is managed by
the board of directors. See ROWLEY & SWRE, supra note 32, at 549.
177 U.S. 449 (1900).
n Id. at 456.
7, Limited partnerships, by definition, have two classes of members: "A limited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons . . . having as members one or more
general partners and one or more limited partners." U.L.P.A. § 1. The requirement of at least
one member with general liability and one with limited liability distinguishes limited partnerships from joint stock companies, general partnerships, and limited partnership associations.
75 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
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case involving a limited partnership to reach a court of appeals. 76
In an opinion delivered by Judge Friendly, the court, although acknowledging the Great Southern rule, 77 held that only the citizenship of the general partners of a New York limited partnership was
relevant to determining diversity. Because a limited partner, under
the applicable New York statute, was not a proper party to a suit
against a partnership unless the action sought to enforce his rights
against or liability to the partnership, 78 . Judge Friendly reasoned
that such a partner should not be considered a "person composing"
the partnership for diversity purposes. Several courts have followed
the Colonial Realty rule in limited partnership cases, 79 and the rule
appears to be settled law in the Second Circuit. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Third'Circuit recently rejected the
Colonial Realty rule in the case of Carlsberg Resources Corp. v.
1 The defendant
Cambria Savings & Loan Association."
was a Pennsylvania corporation and the named plaintiff, a California corporation, was the sofe 'general partner of the plaintiff limited partnership, some of whose limited partners were citizens of Pennsylvania.
Because plaintiffs failed to aver that all the limited partners were
of citizenship diverse from the defendants, the district court dismissed the case in reliance on the Chapman-Boulignyline of authority." On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized that plaintiff's theory
was not that the entity was a citizen for diversity purposes, but that
the citizenship of the general partners only was determinative. The
court framed the issue as "whether parties of divergent status may
be treated differently forpurposes of an.evaluation regarding diversity jurisdiction." 3

11It is not entirely surprising that it was almost 150 years after the first limited partnership statute that this issue was first litigated at the appellate level, since limited partnerships
were apparently not widely used as large-scale investment enterprises until after World War
H. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 150.
1 358 F.2d at 183. "[Clitizenship of a limited partnership [is] not sufficiently made
out for diversity purposes by alleging the state of its organization .
13Id. at 183-84.
71 See, e.g., C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnership, 375 F.
Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Sands v. Geller, 321 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
M See, e.g., Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum);
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf. Lewis v.
Odell, 503 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1974) (general partnership case stating that "for purposes of
diversity a partnership is a citizen of each state of which a general partner is a citizen," id.
at 446); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Wheeler, 419 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (general partnership case citing Lewis as controlling).
, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.Pa.
1976). The court considered the jurisdictional question sua sponte.
3 554 F.2d at 1259.
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Judge Adams, writing for the majority, set forth two distinct
threads of analysis. 4 The court first analyzed the issue in terms of
the "interplay" between the complete diversity requirement of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss8' and the treatment of unincorporated associations in Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouligny. Although recognizing that those precedents "do not squarely address the exact
question posed" in this case, 86 the majority relied on inferences that
it believed could reasonably be drawn from the treatment in those
decisions of associations with more than one class of members. The
majority read Chapman 7 as involving an association with two
classes of member: the president, who had the capacity to sue, and
all other shareholders in the joint stock company. In the Supreme
Court's holding that all the members' citizenship was relevant
"[diespite such class distinctions," the majority found implicit "a
refusal . . . to differentiate between classes of association or partnership members regarding questions of diversity." 8 Because the
association members in Great Southern were of a single class, the
majority could only conjecture that the requirement of looking to all
members of the association "may well apply" to the limited partnership as well. 9 On its reading of Chapman and Great Southern, the
court necessarily viewed the ColonialRealty decision as creating an
"exception" from the general rule for unincorporated associations
and from the "traditional treatment of partnerships."' In view of
the "hard line"'" which the Bouligny Court had taken against expansion of diversity jurisdiction, the court could not countenance
the Colonial Realty "exception."
The court had reasons apart from the implications of Supreme
Court precedent for rejecting the ColonialRealty approach. It found
the Second Circuit's capacity-to-sue rationale to be problematic in
several respects. First, the court was disturbed by the apparent
anomaly of considering capacity to sue before determining the jurisdictional issue. Second, the court thought it persuasive against the
m The court prefaced its analysis of the issue with a discussion of the policy considerations that the court said would "serve to frame our inquiry." Id. at 1257. The two factors relied
on by the majority were: (1) the "additional burdens" that would be imposed on an already
overtaxed federal court system, id. at 1256, and (2) the violation of the "cardinal precepts"
of federalism engendered by an expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas traditionally
within the responsibility of state courts. Id. at 1257.
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
554 F.2d at 1259.
See text and notes at notes 31-34 supra.
554 F.2d at 1259.

Id. at 1258.
N

Id. at 1262.

'

Id. at 1259.
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capacity test that the test would "empower state legislators or state
courts to determine the perimeters of federal jurisdiction," and thus
make diversity jurisdiction "dependent on the vagaries of state
law." Finally, the test appeared to the court to violate the command of rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the
Federal Rules not be construed to expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." Assuming that Colonial Realty relied on rule 17(b)
as authority for applying the state capacity rules for diversity purposes,94 the court thought that such reliance ran afoul of rule 82 by
operating to "liberalize access to the federal courts."'9 - It concluded
that the capacity of limited partners to sue is "deserving of consideration only after the jurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly
established.""
Judge Hunter, in dissent, disagreed with both lines of reasoning
followed by the majority. He first found that established jurisdictional rules for unincorporated associations did not govern because
the Supreme Court had never considered diversity jurisdiction for
an entity similar to a modern limited partnership. In finding the
Colonial Realty position to be a corollary rather than an exception
to the rule for general partnerships, the dissent focused on the
unique character of the membership of a limited partnership and
concluded that the Strawbridge requirement of diversity of citizenship of all parties representing the "distinct interests" in an action
required the court to determine first just who these parties are. In
the case of partnerships, Judge Hunter found that the court must
look to "the state law that shapes them."" Noting the provisions of
the U.L.P.A. that protect limited partners from unlimited liability,
curtail their role in management of the partnership, and preclude
their participation in suits involving the partnership," Judge
12Id. at 1261.
13 FED. R. Crv. P. 82 provides that "the Federal Rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."
11FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he capacity of an individual,
other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by
the law of his domicile."

554 F.2d at 1261.
Id. at 1260.
17Id.

at 1263-64.

Id. at 1264.

Section 7 of the U.L.P.A. provides that "[a] limited partner shall not become liable
as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited
partner, he takes part in the control of the business." Compare U.L.P.A. § 10, which sets forth
the rights of limited partners. Section 26 of the U.L.P.A. provides that "[a] contributor,
unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership,
except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the
partnership."
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Hunter observed that "the majority would have us take cognizance,
for diversity purposes, of persons who, under state law, are clearly
prohibited from taking part in a suit by or against the partnership.
This, to me, appeals neither to logic nor to common sense."100
The majority was incorrect in concluding that the Colonial
Realty rule is foreclosed by the Supreme Court precedents. As noted
by the dissent, Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouligny held only
that unincorporated associations cannot be granted entity citizenship for jurisdictional purposes. Moreover, the majority's reliance
on Great Southern and Chapman goes well beyond the facts of those
cases. There is nothing in Great Southern to support the majority's
supposition that the case implicitly rejected any jurisdictional distinction based on the character of separate classes of membership.101
The majority's deduction from Chapman that all association members must be counted for diversity purposes, regardless of capacity
to sue, would be convincing only if the joint stock company in
Chapman had in fact been composed of more than one class of
member. The fact that the president in that case could function as
the named party in an action involving the company, however, did
not reflect any difference in substantive or procedural rights and
liabilities.' 2 Thus, the Supreme Court in Chapman and Great
Southern did not explicitly refuse to distinguish between classes of
members for diversity purposes, nor is the silence of those cases on
that point evidence that the Court disapproved such an approach.
Judge Hunter in dissent more accurately concluded that "[t]he
Supreme Court has not even touched on the topic.' ' 0 3 Its questionable reading of Supreme Court authority led the majority to treat
ColonialRealty as a departure from a "general" rule for unincorporated associations, and thus as contrary to Bouligny's interdiction of
judicial enlargement of the diversity jurisdiction.
Although Colonial Realty is not, as the Carlsberg majority
thought, plainly contrary to specific Supreme Court precedents, the
question remains whether it is more consistent with diversity jurisdiction policies and precedent than is CarlsbergResources. Prima
facie, the Third Circuit has the better of it: the Carlsbergrule seems
a reasonable application of the Great Southern "persons compos554 F.2d at 1265.
,01
See note 36 supra.
, The provision in Chapman for suit in the name of the president was permissive only
and did not act in derogation of a party's right to sue all members of the company as general
partners. N.Y. CODE OF CrVL PROCEDURE § 1919 (1883). See RowLEY & SIvE, supra note 32,
at 625. But see note 66 supra.Each member's personal assets stood behind the debts of the
company. See note 32 supra.
"1 554 F.2d at 1264.
lw
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ing" test, for it is undeniable that limited partners are "persons
composing" the limited partnership, even though they lack capacity
to sue. The brief discussion of the jurisdictional issue in Colonial
Realty did not spell out the relationship between capacity-to-sue
rules and the law of diversity jurisdiction. Although the Carlsberg
majority is correct in saying that the capacity of an entity to sue
does not confer citizenship for diversity purposes,1 4 it does not follow that a limited partner's incapacity to sue is irrelevant to
whether his citizenship counts for diversity purposes. 0 5 In order to
determine whether Carlsbergstates the rule that is more consistent
with diversity doctrine, it is necessary to inquire more closely into
the alternatives suggested by ColonialRealty.
B.

Analysis of Colonial Realty

1. The Capacity-to-Sue Approach. Both Colonial Realty and
the CarlsbergResources dissent appear superficially to have analyzed the issue in terms of the procedural capacities of the partners.
Under this view, limited partners are acknowledged as persons composing the partnership, but only those partners who have capacity
to sue or be sued on behalf of the partnership under applicable state
law are counted for diversity purposes.' The approach of resting
federal jurisdiction on capacity to sue has been used in other contexts. 0 7 In Mexican CentralRailway Co. v. Eckman, ,"the Supreme
,0Indeed, this was-the substance of the holdings in Chapman and Great Southern.
" The distinction between allowing capacity to sue to confer entity citizenship, on the
one hand, and the effect that capacity to sue might have on the relevance to diversity
jurisdiction of a class of members, on the other, was not acknowledged by the majority, which
observed that the "Supreme Court has ...declined to view problems involving diversity
jurisdiction through the perspective of capacity to sue." 554 F.2d at 1260 & n.24. This failure
is noted by Judge Hunter in his dissent. Id. at 1263 n.5.
10 In his dissent in CarlsbergResources Judge Hunter noted that, although capacity to
sue and diversity jurisdiction were separate issues, "capacity to sue-as dictated by state
law-generally selects the proper parties, for diversity purposes." 554 F.2d at 1263 n.6.
I"See, e.g., Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 307 (1808); Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 856-57 (1824). The general principle that
the citizenship of the named party is looked to in determining diversity when a party has
the right to sue or be sued on behalf of others is subject to the limitation that where the named
party is a mere "conduit" the citizenship of the persons whose rights and liabilities are being
enforced will determine diversity. This exception, acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. 172, 177 (1870), is summarized in 13 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRAMCC AND PRocEDUPR 629-30 (1975):
[Tihe representative must have actual powers with regard to the matter in litigation.
Accordingly, when the representative cannot prevent the institution or prosecution of
the actions, or exercise any control over them, and is a mere conduit through whom the
law affords a remedy to persons aggrieved, the representative party is treated as a
nominal party, and the citizenship of those who are being represented is determinative.
[footnote omitted].
1- 187 U.S. 429 (1903).

1978]

Limited Partnerships& Diversity Jurisdiction

Court held that the citizenship of a guardian, rather than that of
the minor he represented, was determinative if the guardian had
capacity to sue in his own name." 9 More recently, the Third Circuit
followed Eckman in Fallat v. Gouran,10 another guardianship case.
The Fallatcourt described the capacity-to-sue approach as a means
of "defining" the jurisdictional requirement."' By viewing the reliance on rule 17 capacity-to-sue provisions as merely definitional,
the court saw no violation of the limitation imposed by rule 82.112
Eckman and Fallat demonstrate that, the Carlsbergmajority's
objections notwithstanding,113 rule 17(b) often makes federal jurisdiction turn on the "vagaries of state law." If, for example, state law
permits a general partnership to sue or be sued as an entity, but not
as a class, the lack of diversity between one partner and an opposing
party destroys diversity. But if state law permits suits by or against
the partnership as a class, rule 17(b) allows the action to proceed
as a class action, and diversity jurisdiction can be invoked by naming a class representative of citizenship diverse to the opposing parties.'
Although some precedent supports the use of capacity to sue as
a limitation on the Great Southern "persons composing" test, reliance on capacity to sue alone is unsatisfactory as a general jurisdictional principle. Entities treated one way under unquestioned precedents would be treated differently under a strict capacity-to-sue
test. In Chapman, for example, the joint stock company was empowered to sue only in the name of its president or treasurer.11 5 Rote
application of the capacity-to-sue rule would indicate, contrary to
the Supreme Court's decision, that only the named officer's citizenship was relevant for diversity purposes. In order to reach the Supreme Court's conclusion that the citizenship of all the parties represented (all the members of the company) rather than that of the
representative only (the president of the company) is relevant to
diversity, a court would have to apply an analogue to the "conduiit"
I" Id. at 433-34 ("The question is whether under the laws of Texas a guardian can sue
in his own name . .
").
I' 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955). The majority opinion in CarlsbergResources did not cite
either Eckman or Fallat, although it did note, at 554 F.2d 1260 n.24, the case of McSparran
v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968), that recognized the rule
stated in Fallatbut created an exception for collusive appointment of an out-of-state guardian for the sole purpose of creating federal jurisdiction.
"
220 F.2d at 328.
"' Id.
at 327-28.
" See text at note 92 supra.
" See Comment, The Problem of Capacity in Union Suits: A Potpourriof Erie, Diversity, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1185 (1959).
"I See text and note at note 102 supra.
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exception applied in representative actions. In representative suits
the courts will look beyond the representative to the citizenship of
the persons represented if the latter exercise so much control over
the representative that he is a mere "conduit" for the enforcement
1 The representative in Chapman could be viewed
of their rights."
as a "conduit" for all the other members since he had no greater
rights or liabilities than the others and was powerless to prevent
institution of the suit. Thus a naked capacity-to-sue test is unsatisfactorily narrow. An approach based on capacity to sue can be
squared with the precedents only if it is supplemented by an
"exception" designed to take account of the citizenship of control117
ling persons who lack capacity to sue.
2. The "Real Party" Approach. Although Judge Friendly in
Colonial Realty and Judge Hunter in his Carlsberg Resources dissent seemed to emphasize the importance of general partners' capacity to sue, this does not necessarily imply that capacity is determinative. Judge Hunter clearly embraced a broader view. He would
look to "those who have the capacity to bring suit, and in some cases
where the categories diverge, those who are the real parties in interest." ' 8 Under Judge Hunter's approach capacity to sue is not important intrinsically, but is relevant only insofar as it reflects certain
facts about the relative rights and liabilities of the persons composing the association. He explained how his "real party" concept applies to cases involving general partnerships:
See note 107 supra.
,, An additional difficulty with a bare capacity-to-sue test involves the choice of law in
determining that capacity. Choice of law under this approach might appear to be governed
by rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. . . .In all other cases capacity
to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court
is held ....
On its face, the rule seems to demand reference to the domicile of each limited partner.
However, the law of a limited partner's domicile should be irrelevant to the jurisdictional
question since that same law is unlikely to apply to the substantive issues concerning the
rights and liabilities of the limited partners. The alternative provision of rule 17(b) might be
invoked on the theory that consideration of an individual's capacity to sue to determine
jurisdiction over an entity, rather than over that individual, is within the scope of the "other
cases" contemplated by the rule. The majority in Carlsberg Resources assumed without
explanation that this latter portion of rule 17(b) would govern and therefore that forum state
law would apply. 554 F.2d at 1261 & n.26.
The incongruity of automatically applying the law of the limited partner's domicile or
the law of a possibly disinterested forum to determine diversity jurisdiction over a limited
partnership reinforces the conclusion that the limited partner's participation in controlling
the enterprise, rather than his capacity to sue, ought to determine the relevance of his
citizenship to the issue of diversity jurisdiction.
I8 554 F.2d at 1263.
116
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In a general partnership, each partner is jointly and
equally responsible for the organization's affairs. Each can sue
on behalf of the partnership. Thus when a general partnership
brings suit in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction, the
court turns to state law and determines that. . . each must be
"counted" for diversity purposes."'
Judge Hunter's view of the basis of the partnership diversity
rule finds no explicit support in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Great Southern, but it is certainly a cogent explanation of the rule
of that case. It is not entirely surprising that the Court in Great
Southern gave no reason for looking to the citizenship of all the
partners; once the Court had concluded that the limited partnership
association was not a "citizen" for diversity purposes, the only alternative was to look to all its constituent members. 2 ' The limited
partnership association had but one class of members, all of whom
had full management rights and obligations, and all of whom enjoyed limited liability. 2' The Great Southern rule also makes sense
in suits by or against general partnerships, because both the common law and the Uniform Partnership Act regard general partner22
ships as joint enterprises. The partners jointly run the business,
all have management rights in the business, 2 3 and all are personally
liable for partnership obligations.'2 4 An action by or against a general partnership under a common name statute is an action to enforce the cumulative rights or obligations of all the partners.
When we turn to the case of limited partnerships and examine
the "state law that shapes them," the justification for looking to the
citizenship of all the partners is not so apparent. As Judge Hunter
noted in his dissent, limited partners are a "distinct breed.' 21 5 The
Official Comments to section 1 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act point out that a limited partner "is not in any sense a part119Id.

' To have eliminated all the partners from consideration would have left the partnership with no citizenship for diversity purposes.
121 See note 36 supra.
I' A partner's interest in partnership was regarded at common law as a modified form
of tenancy in common. See CRANE &BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 228; Campbell, Partnership
Obligationsand Their Enforcement, 32 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127 (1954). UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as U.P.A.] § 25 (1914) similarly describes
partners' property rights.
' U.P.A. § 18(e). For the common law rule see, for example, Bengston v. Shain, 42
Wash. 2d 404, 255 P.2d 892 (1953).
"I U.P.A. § 15. For the common law rule see C. BATES, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 477 & n.5
(1888).
"' Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d at 1265.
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ner.' 2 His rights with respect to management of the partnership
are very narrow and do not include the right to bind the partnership
in contract, the right to dispose of partnership property, or the right
to vote in matters concerning the business of the partnership.'1 A
limited partner, while entitled to his distributive share of the partnership profits, does not have an interest in the property of the
partnership12 8 nor can he cause dissolution of the partnership except
by judicial decree."2 9 Because of these restrictions, a limited partner
is not liable to third persons for the debts or torts of the partnership'30 and cannot sue or be sued on behalf of the partnership.'31
Unlike a general partner or a member of a joint stock company, a
limited partner is not an agent of the association or of the individual
members. 32 He can best be characterized as a "mere contributor of
capital."" Thus in most cases limited partners cannot realistically
be deemed parties to actions by or against the partnership.
The "real party" approach advocated by Judge Hunter is virtually identical to the supplemented capacity-to-sue approach discussed earlier. 134 Both tests focus on the element of control. A court
applying either test would not look to the citizenship of a limited
partner unless the partner had assumed such powers of management that he could be deemed a party in fact.
III.

EVALUATION OF THE COMPETING

RULES

The lower court cases thus reveal two distinct approaches to
determining diversity jurisdiction in suits involving limited partnerships. The first of these-the approach of the majority in Carlsberg
22

6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 564 (1969).

1v U.L.P.A. §§ 4, 7, 9, & 10; see CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 273 n.2. Cf. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15507 (West 1977) (permitting limited partners to exercise certain voting rights
without losing limitation on liability).
12 Compare U.L.P.A. §§ 10 and 18 with U.P.A. § 25.
21 Compare U.P.A. §§ 29 and 31 (dissolution of partnership when any partner severs
relationship with partnership) with U.L.P.A. § 10. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at
517.
130U.L.P.A. § 7,9. See U.P.A. § 15.
M U.L.P.A. § 26 provides: "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper
party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership." But see Note, Standing of
Limited Partnersto Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1965).
22 Lynn v. Cohen, 359 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See U.P.A. § 9(1).
M Alley v. Clark, 71 F. Supp. 521, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 1947) (limited partners have no proprietary interest in partnership, merely a creditor's interest); cf. Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974) (exchange of limited partnership interest for general
partnership interest is not a "like-kind" exchange because limited partner does not have
general partner's broad spectrum of rights and liabilities).
"I See text and notes at notes 115-117 supra.
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Resources-is consistent with the broad literal reading of Chapman
and Great Southern. The second approach-the "real parties" rule
articulated by Judge Hunter-is reconcilable with the narrow holding of those cases. Further analysis reveals, however, that the latter
approach is more consistent both with the corpus of diversity precedents and with the policy underlying the statute.
A.

Judicial Doctrine

The Carlsbergcourt rested its decision on what it viewed as the
established rule for all unincorporated associations. That rule-that
the court must look to the citizenship of all the members of the
association-contrasts sharply with the Marshallrule for corporate
entities. It is commonly thought that the unincorporated association
rule can be assimilated to Marshall on the ground that although the
Court's decision had the effect of treating the corporation as a citizen, the Court nevertheless regarded the shareholders' citizenship
as relevant to diversity. "[Tihe Court," said Justice Fortas in
Bouligny, "indulged in the fiction that, although the corporation
was not itself a citizen for diversity purposes, its shareholders would
35
conclusively be presumed citizens of the incorporating State.'
The Court in Marshall did state its presumption of citizenship
in terms of the "persons" who act under the corporate "faculties."' 36
A close reading of Justice Grier's opinion suggests, however, that the
presumption extended not to the shareholders but to the representatives of the shareholders-the directors-who were the "real parties" to the suit.' 7 Thus the presumption of citizenship (which had
"I United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 148 (1965). This
is the traditional reading of Marshall. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d
392, 394 (2d Cir. 1964); C. WmoIrr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 101 (3d ed.
1976); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1426, 1428 (1964). Indeed, there has been
little reason to question this reading of the case since the effebt of the presumption-treating
a corporation as a citizen of its incorporation state-made it irrelevant to whom the presumption applied.
' Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853).
,' The key sentence of the opinion is frustratingly ambiguous. The Court was unclear
as to the referents of the presumption regarding those "persons who act under [the corporate] faculties." Earlier in the opinion the Court noted that shareholders have the "faculties"
of acting through their elected representatives in their collective corporate name. 57 U.S. at
327. Later, though, the Court stated that an averment of the state of creation of a corporation
was sufficient for jurisdictional purposes because of the presumption with respect to those
exercising the corporate "faculties," the "real defendants" in the suit; these "real defendants," or "real parties to the controversy" were recognized by the Court as being not the
shareholders, but their representatives. Id. at 328-29; see Green, Corporations as Persons,
Citizens and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 213 (1946). As an example of the
need for the presumption of citizenship, the Court noted that without it a corporation could
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the effect of treating the corporation as a citizen) followed the initial
determination to regard only "real parties" as relevant for diversity
purposes.
Marshall can be viewed as part of a broader spectrum of contemporaneous decisions that held that the relevant citizenship for
diversity purposes in suits brought by a person in the beneficial
interest of another was that of the representative, the "real
party.' 38 In Bonnafee v. Williams,' 31 which decided the jurisdictional status of the trustee and beneficiaries of a trust, the Court
held that "[w]here . . .the legal right to sue is in the plaintiff, the
court will not inquire into the residence of those who may have an
equitable interest in the claim."' 40 The relationship between the
trustee and beneficiaries in Bonnafee is analogous to the relationship between directors and shareholders, as the Marshall opinion
acknowledged:
[T]he court in deciding the question of jurisdiction, will look
behind the corporate or collective name given to the party, to
find the persons who act as the representatives, curators or
trustees, of the association, stockholders or cestuis que trust,
and in such capacity are the real parties to the contro-

versy.

.... 141

This same trust analogy was invoked in the 1832 decision of the New
York Court of Chancery, which first recognized a shareholder derivdefeat jurisdiction "by electing a single director residing in a different state." Id. at 328
(emphasis added).
Additional support for this reading of the case can be drawn from the dissenting opinions.
Justice Catron, whose opinion was summarized by the Court reporter, apparently objected
only to the holding that the requisite citizenship of the corporate officers and directors need
not be averred to maintain jurisdiction. 57 U.S. at 337. Indeed, in his concurrence in Rundle
v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852), Justice Catron had stated:
"If the president and directors [of a corporation] are citizens of the State where the corporation was created, and the other party to the suit is a citizen of a different State. . . then the
courts of the United States can exercise jurisdiction under the third article of the Constitution." Id. at 94. Justice Daniel's dissent in Marshall, which reiterated that the parties to the
suit must be citizens and that these citizens must meet the statutory diversity requirements,
argued that the majority's rule failed to satisfy both requirements. 57 U.S. at 339-41. The
position which he attacked was not that the shareholders could be presumed citizens of the
state of incorporation, but "that a corporation, created by a state, can have no being or
faculties beyond the limits of that state; and if its president and officers reside within that
state, such a conjuncture will meet and satisfy the predicament laid down by the Constitution." Id. at 338. That the citizenship of these parties need not be averred he regarded as a
double perversion of the Constitution.
' See McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9, 15 (1844).
'' 44 U.S. (3 How.) 573 (1845).
,' Id. at 577.
' 57 U.S. at 328-29.
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ative right of action.12
Thus, the principle unifying the apparently conflicting jurisdictional precedents is not the "persons composing" rule but the
"control" or "real party" concept.' The members of joint stock
companies, limited partnership associations, and general partnerships "count" for diversity purposes because all the members exercise management powers. This control is manifested in several
ways: in the management role of the respective members, their
rights with respect to entity property, their ability to effect dissolution of the entity, their liability for the entity's debts and obligations, and in their capacity to sue and be sued on behalf of the
entity. Corporate shareholders and trust beneficiaries, in contrast,
have only "equitable" interests in their respective entities. Because
limited partners do not enjoy the requisite control over the partnership,'44 they have only an "equitable" interest in proceedings
brought by or against the partnership, and thus, like corporate
shareholders and trust beneficiaries, should not be counted for diversity purposes.' The result in ColonialRealty, far from expanding the diversity jurisdiction, is but an application of a principle
underlying the Supreme Court's diversity jurisdiction decisions over
the past 125 years.
B.

The Statutory Policy

At an earlier time, the Carlsberg Resources rule, it is clear,
would have been in complete harmony with Supreme Court diversity jurisdiction doctrine. In the Deveaux case, decided in 1809, the
Supreme Court held that a suit against a corporation was, "in fact
and in law," a suit against the corporation's shareholders.'46 The
Marshall Court's departure from Deveaux can be viewed as an exercise in purposive statutory interpretation. Although longstanding
judicial interpretation (with the exception of the apparently aber,"2 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832). "The directors are the trustees or
managing partners, and the stockholders are cestui que trusts . . . ." Id. at 232. See Comment, Standingof Limited Partnersto Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1469 (1965).
"I Thus it makes sense to have jurisdiction depend upon the citizenship of the directors
of a corporation even though the corporation is itself a distinct entity. A corporation itself
cannot act. Control of the corporation is exercised through its agents: the directors, acting
collectively. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 119, 137 (rev. ed. 1946).
"' See text and notes at notes 127-132 supra.
,4 The courts have noted that the characteristics of limited partners make them significantly more like shareholders than general partners. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.) ("[I]n the main, a limited partner
is more like a shareholder. ... ."); Ruzicka v. Hager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197-98, 111 N.E.2d 878,
881 (1953) (position of limited partner is "analogous to that of a corporate shareholder").
"' See text and notes at notes 16-18 supra.
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rant Letson
decision) precluded treating corporations as
'
"citizens," 147
nothing in the statute or the Constitution demanded
that jurisdiction be determined by reference to the citizenship of all
the shareholders. Statute and Constitution permitted, and the statute's purpose of protecting litigants from local bias dictated, the
opening of the diversity jurisdiction to corporations. Justice Grier
said in Marshall:
The right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege
of no small practical importance, and more especially in cases
where a distant plaintiff has to contend with the power and
influence of great numbers and the combined wealth wielded
by corporations in almost every state. It is of importance also
to corporations themselves that they should enjoy the same
privileges, in other states, where local prejudices or jealousy
8
might injuriously affect them.11
The Marshall Court's statement expresses the traditional view
of the policy behind the diversity jurisdiction.14 9 The diversity jurisdiction has been attacked by many modern commentators as unnecessary and unwise,' and has been defended on grounds surely undreamed of by the Framers and original legislators.' The Carlsberg
court was not, of course, guided by the policy underlying the statute.
Rather the court embraced the modern view, sanctioned, the court
thought, by Bouligny, that strong policy considerations extraneous
to the statute argue against any "expansion" of the diversity jurisdiction. Those policy reasons-overcrowded federal dockets"'2 (and
the resultant delay in vindicating litigants' rights) and deference to
3
state courts as the preferred oracles of state law15 -may
be compelSee text and notes at notes 23, 27 supra.
57 U.S. at 329.
,' See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
"4

150See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 458-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 144-46 (1973); Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity

Jurisdiction-InReply to Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. Rav. 1097 (1931).
"I These include the arguments that the quality of justice in the federal courts is superior
to that of the state courts, Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past, Present and
Future, 43 TEx. L. Rv.1, 21-23 (1964); that the federal and state courts can form a valuable
"partnership" in improving the quality of justice, id. at 25; that the exposure to federal court
enhances the competence of lawyers otherwise limited to local practice, Wright, The Federal
Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 327 (1967); and that
federal adjudication of multi-state controversies "like student-lunch programs ... is a socially beneficent service which the federal government should extend when it is constitutional
to do so." Id.
152554 F.2d at 1256-57.
'

Id. at 1257.
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ling arguments for amending the statute, but they are scarcely proper guides for courts interpreting the present version. Judge
Friendly has articulated similar concerns in the literature and has
cogently stated the case against the diversity jurisdiction;'54 yet in
his role as judge he has quite properly given full effect to the (in his
view mistaken) legislative judgment informing the statute.'5 5 Nor is
the diversity statute a legislative enactment that might be avoided
because it has outlived its purpose. There is sufficient evidence that
the threat of prejudice to out-of-state litigants remains a real one. 56
It could be argued, by analogy to Strawbridge, that the protective policy of the statute does not require a federal court to try an
action involving a limited partnership so long as one of the limited
partners is a co-citizen of a party on the other side of the litigation.
The Strawbridge rule was apparently predicated on the theory that
identity of citizenship between any two opposing parties guaranteed
impartiality because the state court could not favor a forum state
citizen without hurting another.'5 7 That rationale might also be
thought applicable to cases in which a party is a co-citizen of a nonparty who has an adverse interest in the outcome of the litigation.
This argument should be rejected. First, the complete diversity requirement attributed to Strawbridge is limited to the actual parties
to the controversy for good reason: persons only beneficially interested in a lawsuit (be they shareholders, trust beneficiaries, or limited partners) generally will not be known to the court. Second,
application of the complete diversity rule very often outstrips the
rule's rationale. The presence of a non-diverse opposing party does
not protect a party who is not a citizen of the forum state, nor does
it protect the forum state citizen whose stake in the litigation is
minor by comparison with the stake of his co-citizen opponent. The
rule is basically unsound and should be kept within its traditional
boundaries.
I" See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 144-46 (1973).
's Judge Friendly authored the court's opinion in Colonial Realty.
See Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction:A Survey and A Proposal,91 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 329-32 (1977). The commentary accompanying the ALl Study reached the conclusion that the traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction remains at least partially valid
today. ALI STUDY, supra note 150 at 105-11. Finding that there was still the risk (or at least
fear of the risk) of prejudice to out-of-state litigants, the ALI stated that "it would be hard
to justify total abolition of an existing jurisdiction while there remains risk of the very kind
of prejudice against which the federal judicial power was originally designed to provide
protection." Id. at 106-07.
" The soundness of the Strawbridge rule is open to serious question. See Currie, supra
note 8, at 18-34. The ALl concluded that the Strawbridgerule is not a constitutional mandate
and hence could be circumvented by legislation expanding diversity. ALI STUDY, supra note
150, at 426-36.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[45:384

Given the policy of the statute, a convincing argument can be
made that some forms of unincorporated business association
should be treated as citizens in the same manner as corporations. 8
This argument, however, has been foreclosed by Bouligny, in which
the Court, though acknowledging the force of the policy argument
for extending entity citizenship, held that policy arguments alone
could not justify judicial assumption of a role the Court regarded
as reserved to Congress.'59 Within that constraint, the approach
most consistent with the statutory policy is the "real party" approach advocated by Judge Hunter in his Carlsberg dissent.
IV.

APPLYING THE REAL PARTY RULE

In suits by or against a limited partnership, the "real parties"
on the partnership side are those who manage the partnership and
whose personal resources stand behind the partnership's debts. In
determining diversity, a court should look to the citizenship of these
parties-the general partners. When an action is brought in district
court, or removal to district court is sought, the party invoking
federal jurisdiction has the burden of pleading facts necessary to
establish jurisdiction. 6 ° The party seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction in a limited partnership case could generally do so by
averring that the entity is a limited partnership and that the citizenship of all those persons identified in the partnership agreement
as general partners is diverse from that of all the opposing parties.
The characterization found in the partnership agreement will
not always be conclusive, however. The rationale for generally disregarding the citizenship of limited partners would seem to demand
that the courts count for diversity purposes purported limited part58 See Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964). The ALI adopted
the approach of treating unincorporated associations as entities for diversity purposes. ALI
STUDY, supra note 150, at 114-16 (commentary on proposed Judicial Code § 1301(b)(2)).
Partnerships, business trusts, and limited partnerships can sometimes be viewed as
having distinct identities apart from that of their individual members. A limited partnership,
which must be organized pursuant to publicly filed certificates of limited partnership, can
be said to have a kind of geographical identity. This geographical identity may well benefit
the limited partnership in litigation in its "home" state against out-of-state parties. Similarly, the partnership might be subject to discrimination in actions in a foreign forum, even
though some of the general partners who are personally liable are citizens of that state. Cf.
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (concerning potential
dangers of prejudice for and against a corporation in litigation with a party from another
state). The argument for treating limited partnerships as citizens is stronger than for general
partnerships since a limited partnership, or a party bringing an action against it, often cannot
create federal jurisdiction by resorting to a class action because the limited and general
partners will in many cases have divergent interests. See note 66 supra.
159 See text and note at note 55 supra.
"' See Hanford v. Davis, 163 U.S. 273 (1896).
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ners who exercise substantial managerial control over partnership
affairs. If the jurisdictional averment is challenged, or if the court
has reason to suspect the status of one or more limited partners, the
court will have to determine whether a non-diverse limited partner
has been granted under the partnership agreement, or has in fact
exercised, such managerial control that he should be deemed a "real
party.""'' This qualification on the jurisdictional rule corresponds to
both the "conduit" exception to the representative party rule6 2 and
the "collusive appointment" exception to the rule for determining
diversity in cases involving guardians.'63
The question remaining is how the district court should go
about determining whether a limited partner is a "real party" to the
action. One reason for counting a limited partner who exercises
management powers is that he is in fact a representative of the
partnership. A second reason has to do with the risks the partner
runs as a price for meddling in management matters. Because a
limited partner, under the U.L.P.A., loses the privilege of limited
liability by exercising too much control,'6 4 a managing limited partner has a far greater financial stake in the partnership than his
brethren limited partners. Since the latter rationale for counting the
partner is at least as compelling as the former, a partner should be
deemed a real party to an action involving the limited partnership
if he has exercised such control over partnership affairs that he runs
a substantial risk of being held personally liable for partnership
debts in the event the partnership becomes insolvent. This is necessarily a matter of guesswork, for the court cannot know how or where
6 5 the limitation on the partner's liability
or under what state law"
might someday be tested. A rule of convenience is needed, and the
"I If the defendant chalenges federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of defeating defendant's objection. McNutt v. McHenry Chevrolet Co., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Ray v.
Bird & Son & Asset Realization Co., 519 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1975). Similarly, when the
defendant seeks removal to district court, he has the burden of showing that the elements of
plaintiff's allegations that would defeat jurisdiction are so baseless as to fraudulently deprive
him of access to federal court. Rosario v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 158 F. Supp. 537
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); see Wecker v. National Enameling Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1906).
"'2 See note 107 supra.
"I See, e.g., O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969) (construing 28 U.S.C. §
1359 (1970)); McSparran v. Wiest, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
164See U.L.P.A. § 7.
I's
If the limited partners's status as such for liability purposes is in issue in the action
against the partnership there is no uncertainty as to the law under which that issue is to be
decided, for the court would simply look to the forum state's choice of law rules. Klaxon v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1940). If, however, the plaintiff is asserting that
the limited partner is personally liable for plaintiff's injury, the limited partner will be a
named party defendant, thus avoiding the inquiry into whether he is a "real party."
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most obvious choice is to test the partner's status by the law of the
state of the partnership's organization,' which is perhaps the law
that is most likely to apply in the event the partner's status is put
to the test.
In cases in which the averment of jurisdictional facts is controverted by the claim that one or more non-diverse limited partners
should be considered a general partner for diversity purposes, extensive threshold litigation could ensue.' 67 The possibility of such
pretrial litigation might seem to argue against applying a limited
partnership counterpart to the conduit exception. The American
Law Institute, in its proposed revision of the Judicial Code, posited
as a rule of drafting a judicial statute: "It is of first importance to
have a definition so clear that it will not invite extensive threshold
litigation over jurisdiction."'18 Similarly, in his critique of the ALI
proposal, Professor Currie noted epigramatically that
"Ii]urisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing" because
jurisdictional litigation is "essentially a waste of time and resources.''169 A jurisdictional test that relies on indicia of control and
potential liability would appear to fly in the face of this unquestionably sound approbation of pretrial jurisdictional litigation.
This objection is not persuasive, however. A certain amount of
16 Two related problems arise under this approach. The first of these, an objection raised
by the majority in CarlsbergResources, is that the limits of federal jurisdiction will vary with
"the vagaries of state law." 554 F.2d 1254, 1261 (3d Cir. 1977). This variation of jurisdictional
access from state to state, however, is hardly unique to this rule. In almost any context
involving multiple parties to suit, state law-whether substantive or procedural-is likely to
have an impact on a party's ability to invoke diversity jurisdiction. See text and notes at notes
113-114 supra. The second concern is that under the law of some states, the criteria for
imposing liability on a limited partner might depart from the concept of control, thus taking
a test focusing on liability outside of the rationale for the real party rule. Although some states
are more liberal than others in permitting limited partners to participate in the control of
the partnership without incurring liability as general partners, see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §
15507 (West 1977) (permitting limited partners to vote on certain managerial decisions without forfeiting limited liability), no state has yet adopted a limited partnership act which
frames the test of liability in terms other than control of the business. This does not mean,
of course, that a limited partnership act (or a statute governing a similar business entity)
could not embrace a liability test substantially independent of control. In such a case the
court would be required to forge, by analogy to the U.L.P.A. and to the factors originally
articulated in Marshall, a "real party" test in terms of other indicia of control.
"I The district court need not dispense with jurisdictional questions on the basis of the
pleadings alone. The court will often look to the pleadings and affidavits, C. WRIGHT, HAND-

BOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

129 & n.9 (3d ed. 1976); where jurisdiction has been

challenged, however, the court has the option of making the factual inquiry itself or submitting the question to a jury. C. WRIGHT, supra at 329. If the jurisdictional inquiry goes to the
merits of the case, the parties might have a right to jury trial. See Note, Trial by Jury of
PreliminaryJurisdictionalFacts in Federal Cases, 48 IowA L. Rav. 471 (1963).
,6RALI STUDY, supra note 150, at 128.
,69 Currie, supra note 8, at 1.
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threshold litigation is inevitable under the present jurisdictional
statutes. Determining whether a non-diverse limited partner should
be treated as a general partner for diversity purposes is no more
complicated than deciding whether a guardian has been collusively
appointed, or whether a representative is a mere "conduit" for the
enforcement of another's rights-threshold tasks which the federal
courts routinely confront. The objection is, moreover, essentially
irrelevant. This comment addresses not a proposed jurisdictional
statute, but an existing one. Once it is determined, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, that jurisdiction turns on the citizenship
of the real parties to the controversy, the burden on the federal
judiciary of determining who those parties are is an unavoidable
70
one.1
V.

THE ANALOGOUS CASE OF BUSINESS TRUSTS

The foregoing analysis has implications for determining diversity jurisdiction in cases involving business trusts. The "control"
principle gleaned from the cases would seem to require the courts
to take into account the beneficiaries' rights or powers of management.
Recent cases involving real estate investment trusts (REITs)
have viewed the matter as involving a choice from among three
possible rules: the corporate-entity approach, the special rule applicable to trusts, 171 and the unincorporated association rule of
"I This seemingly inevitable complexity might be mitigated by an appropriate adjustment of the presumptions and burdens of proof which are associated with establishing diversity jurisdiction. Once the party invoking jurisdiction alleges diversity of citizenship as to the
general partners, the burden of proof could be shifted to the party opposing jurisdiction to
establish that a limited partner whose citizenship would destroy diversity is in fact a general
partner. The court could decide the question on the basis of affidavits submitted by the
parties and could require the party opposing jurisdiction to meet a summary judgment standard of proof to defeat jurisdiction. Cf. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 289 (1938) ("It must appear that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal.") The result of this inquiry at the pleading stage would then be
conclusive on the issue of jurisdiction, even if at trial a limited partner is ultimately adjudged
to have general partner status. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 283 (1970) (determination of
jurisdictional amount conclusive in spite of subsequent lesser judgment). See also C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 127 (3d ed. 1976) (arguments for conclusive determination at pleading stage). The Supreme Court has approved the practice, in an analogous
context, of trying jurisdictional issues in a truncated fashion when those issues might overlap with issues on the merits. In Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957), the Court said that
"the proper course" to determine the issue of management antagonism to the financial
interests of a corporation, for the purpose of aligning parties in a derivative action preliminary
to testing for diversity, "is not to try out the issues presented by the charges of wrongdoing
but to determine the issue of antagonism on th;e face of the pleadings and by the nature of
the controversy." Id. at 96.
"' See text and notes at notes 138-140 supra.
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Chapman and Bouligny. The courts have determined that Bouligny
precludes treating REITs as entities for diversity purposes, and that
the business character of REITs makes the ordinary trust rules inapplicable.7 2 As authority for distinguishing between business
trusts and ordinary trusts courts have relied 173 on the Supreme
74 which
Court's opinion in the case of Morrissey v. Commissioner,1
held that business trusts should be taxed as corporations and not
as traditional trusts because the beneficiaries use such trusts not for
holding and conserving capital, but as vehicles for profit-seeking
venture .1 7 They have refused to apply the ordinary trust citizenship
rule to business trusts because the provisions of business trust agreements, unlike those of ordinary trusts, give the beneficiaries authority to limit the trustee's freedom to dispose of trust property, as well
as the power to remove the trustee without cause' 76 and to amend
the trust agreement.
In some of these cases, the courts may have been quite correct
in finding that it is improper to look to the citizenship of the trustees. In those cases in which the trust agreement granted the beneficiaries broad powers over the trustee, the result might have been the
same had the courts applied the traditional rules of trust citizenship. The trustees of such trusts satisfied the requirement of holding
legal title to the trust property, but they may have been mere conduits through whom the beneficiaries enforced their rights. Thus
under existing jurisdictional precedents the beneficiaries might
17
have been regarded as the relevant parties for diversity purposes.
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the courts have been
applying the "conduit exception" sub rosa or that they have been
using the kind of "real party" approach suggested by Judge Hunter
in CarlsbergResources. Rather, the courts seem to emphasize those
"' See, e.g., Carey v. U.S. Industries, 414 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Lincoln Assocs.,
Inc. v. Great Am. Mortgage Investors, 415 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Jim Walter Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
113 See, e.g., Jim Walter Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 429 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81, 92 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In Lee v.
Navarro Savings Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1976), the court stated specifically that
the choice of jurisdictional rule should turn on the tax status of the trust.
1 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
m Id. at 356-57.
"' See, e.g., Jim Walter Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 97,100 (S.D. Tex.
1975).
"I'See note 107 supra. Reliance on the "conduit" exception is not really an adequate
substitute for examination of the relative rights and liabilities of the trustees and beneficiaries. The trust rules require looking to either the trustees or the beneficiaries, but not to both.
Where the trustees and beneficiaries together are managing the trust business, however, both
should be counted for diversity purposes.
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features of the trustee-beneficiary relationship that justify labeling
the trust a "business" trust, but which features may cumulatively
fall far short of constituting managerial control in any real sense.
The courts have not said, that is, that the beneficiaries count for
diversity purposes because they are the "real parties,"'' 8 but that
the beneficiaries, as members of unincorporated "business" associations, must be counted under Bouligny.
Bouligny should not be regarded as dispositive of all business
trust cases. The determination of proper parties for diversity purposes should not turn on whether the entity is of a "business" character, but on the allocation of rights and liabilities between the
beneficiaries and the trustees. Analysis of the cases from the
perspective of the "real party" principle suggests that some of the
recent REIT cases may have been decided incorrectly. If a beneficiary of a business trust is truly a passive investor who has no significant voice in the management of the trust, like the limited partner
he should not be deemed a party to the action.' Trust agreement
terms that permit the beneficiaries to remove the trustees or to
prevent transfers of trust property do not seem to vest the management of the trust in the beneficiaries; such provisions only give
beneficiaries certain powers that corporate shareholders commonly
'
wield. 80
Determining the real parties in interest is more complicated for
business trusts than for limited partnerships because no uniform
statutory framework clearly defines the relative rights and responsibilities of the two classes of members. In the case of business trusts,
"I'But see Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Pendley, 405 F. Supp. 593
(N.D. Ga. 1975). In that case the court turned the "real party" approach on its head, concluding that since the citizenship of the beneficiaries was controlling, they must be the real parties
to the suit. Id. at 596.
"I'Under the theoretical model of the business trust the role of the beneficiaries is clearly
distinguishable from that of the shareholder in a joint stock company. The shareholders of a
joint stock company choose and control the company's managers, who act as agents of the
shareholders. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 179 n.19. Business trusts, on the other
hand, are non-statutory variations of traditional trusts. The Supreme Court, in Hecht v.
Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924), defined a business trust as "an arrangement whereby property
is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held
and managed for the benefit of such persons as may, from time to time, be the holders of
transferable certificates issued by the trustees . .

. ."

Id. at 146. The business trust differs

significantly from both the joint stock company and the general partnership in that the
beneficiaries are not co-owners of the trust property. ROWLEY & SivE, supra note 32, at 632,
634. Legal title to trust property is vested in the trustees, while the beneficiaries have equitable title only.
I These powers are also comparable to those which limited partners may wield consistently with their limited partner status under more liberal limited partnership acts. See note
166 supra.
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the elements of control and potential personal liability do not mesh
as neatly as they do in the limited partnership context. Some states,
as a matter of public policy, do not permit investors in business
trusts to limit their liabilities at all, regardless of whether they
exercise managerial control. 8 ' Most states recognize limitations on
liability, but will hold liable as general partners beneficiaries who
exercise a certain quantum of control (which varies from state to
state) over the trust.'82 Some of the elements of control that might
cause a beneficiary to lose his limited liability are similar to those
which cause a limited partner to become a general partner: (1) the
right to remove the trustees, (2) the right to terminate the trust, (3)
the right to modify the terms of the trust, (4) the right to elect
trustees, and (5) the right to direct management decisions of the

trustees. 183
Because there is no statutory model of the business trust the
courts have no reason to presume that the trustees are the real
parties to suits involving business trusts. Therefore, the mere averment that the trustees of a REIT are of citizenship diverse from the
opposing parties should not suffice. The court should require the
party invoking federal jurisdiction to submit a copy of the trust
agreement so that the court can determine the extent of the powers
contractually granted the beneficiaries. As in cases involving limited partnerships, the court should also inquire whether non-diverse
beneficiaries exercise powers beyond those specified in the trust
agreement.
A further consequence of the lack of uniform legislation is that
the courts may have to forge a federal "control" test for determining
the real parties to controversies involving business trusts. Although
the same reasons that mandate reference to state law in limited
partnership cases 84 will often apply here as well, the relevant state
law concerning business trusts is less likely to provide a proper
guide, either because the state has little or no caselaw on forfeiture
of limited liability status, or because beneficiaries' potential personal liability under state law is insufficiently related to the question of their control over enterprise affairs.
In cases in which state law seems a poor guide, the district court
could compare the rights and powers of the beneficiaries with those
possessed by the corporate shareholders in Marshall and by the
CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 32, at 173-74.
C'
,82Id. at 174-76.
' ROWLEY & SIVE, supra note 32, at 633.
1" See text and notes at notes 164-166 supra.
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stockholders of the joint stock company in the Chapman case. If
their powers are no more significant than those of corporate shareholders, the beneficiaries should not be counted for diversity purposes. If the beneficiaries can veto or direct trustee management
decisions, however, they should be deemed parties. Alternatively,
the courts could apply the factors that distinguish limited from
general partners under the U.L.P.A. If an investor in a REIT wields
such power that he would be deemed a general partner under the
U.L.P.A.'s control test, he could be deemed a real party to a controversy involving the REIT.
CONCLUSION

Federal diversity jurisdiction extends to those cases in which all
parties on one side of the case are of citizenship diverse from that
of the parties in opposition. Two distinct lines of Supreme Court
authority developed in response to cases involving associations of
individuals. The Court's decision in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad resolved the confusion over whether corporations could be
treated as "citizens" and provided a definitive jurisdictional rule
that was ultimately codified over 100 years later in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c). The Court, however, declined to extend the Marshalldoctrine to grant presumptive state-of-formation citizenship to unincorporated associations. Instead, the Court, in Chapman v. Barney
and Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, held that such
associations may not be deemed citizens, but must satisfy the
complete diversity requirement with respect to all the "persons
composing" the association. The Court has steadfastly adhered
to this rule, reaffirming it most recently in United Steelworkers of
America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.
The Second Circuit, in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,
departed from the tradition of dogmatic application of the
Chapman-GreatSouthern rule and held that in suits involving limited partnerships the citizenship of only the general partners is relevant for diversity purposes. The court relied on the statutory distribution of rights, powers, and responsibilities between the general
and the limited partners in concluding that the latter should be
disregarded in determining diversity. Although the decision has
been followed by courts in the Second and Fourth Circuits, the
Third Circuit, in CarlsbergResources Corp. v. Cambria Savings &
Loan Association, reached a contrary result, finding that Colonial
Realty was not a proper interpretation of the "persons composing"
test, but an unwarranted expansion of the scope of diversity jurisdiction. The majority in CarlsbergResources read the body of Su-
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preme Court precedent as conclusively foreclosing an approach that
would distinguish between classes of association members.
Although the court in ColonialRealty did not fully develop the
reasoning behind its decision, the result in that case stands on solid
ground. Examination of Chapman and Great Southern reveals that
those cases did not reject a distinction for jurisdictional purposes
between classes of association members. On the contrary, the rationale for such a distinction can be culled from a comparison of the
seemingly irreconcilable Marshall and Chapman decisions. In
Marshallthe Court observed that shareholders were not real parties
to litigation involving a corporation and hence were irrelevant to the
jurisdictional test. In Chapman, on the other hand, the joint stock
company's shareholders were clearly the parties controlling the
company, and their personal assets stood behind the company's
debts. The characteristics that compelled reference to all the association members in Chapman are not found in the case of limited
partners, who are analogous to corporate shareholders. A jurisdictional test that looks to the real parties to the controversy not only
makes sense of the diversity precedents, but also accords well with
the protective policy underlying the diversity jurisdiction, a policy
which remains vital today.
In testing for diversity jurisdiction in suits involving limited
partnerships-and in actions involving business trusts-courts
should disregard those members who have no significant control
over the affairs of the enterprise. The determination whether to
count limited partners or business trust beneficiaries as parties to
the controversy might often involve complex jurisdictional factual
investigation, and thus frustrate the desiderata of ease and economy
in the application of jurisdictional tests. These concerns are the
business of Congress, however, and should not sway the courts from
the results demanded by proper interpretation of the statutory grant
of diversity jurisdiction.
Robert J. Kopecky

